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NARROWING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SENTENCING THROUGH A
SYSTEM OF MANDATORY DOWNWARD DEPARTURES
By Douglas Smith*

I

met Allen in Danville, Virginia in the spring of 1993 when
I was the Safety and Security Manager for the Danville
Redevelopment and Housing Authority. Allen was 16 and
lived in a public housing development with his mother and sister.
A model teenager in many respects and an anomaly among those
I often encountered in public housing. Allen was highly motivated, attended school regularly, and had aspirations of attending
college. Most importantly, he avoided all of the pitfalls that
doomed many of his friends: drug and alcohol use, premature
parenthood, and contact with the criminal justice system. Then
on October 16, 1994, after succumbing to peer pressure and in a
semi-drunken haze, Allen participated in the armed robbery of a
Pizza Hut. The police caught up with him after the robbery at
the local hospital, where he was being treated for a gunshot
wound to his leg, which he sustained accidentally after abandoning the robbery.1 He initially lied to the police about the circumstances of injury. However, the next day, he voluntarily admitted
being involved in the robbery. After taking his statement, the
police arrested and charged him with armed robbery and use of a
firearm in the commission of a felony.
Allen decided to plead guilty to the charges. He had many
mitigating factors in his favor including his regular high school
attendance, his cooperation with the police in identifying his
accomplices, the fact that no one was injured during the robbery,
his clean adult record, and testimony received by the court from
family members, one of his high school teachers, and myself.
Yet, the judge sentenced Allen to 40 years for armed robbery
with ten years suspended, and three years for the use of a firearm
in the commission of a felony, all to be served consecutively.
His sentence was nearly four and one half times the national average maximum state court sentence for robbery and virtually
double the national average maximum state court sentence for
murder.2 The only “positive” was that Allen was eligible for
parole, having committed his offense less than two months before Virginia abolished parole.
As of March 2, 2005, Allen had served ten years in prison,
more than double the average time served by individuals with a
prior felony record who committed robbery before Virginia’s
abolition of parole,3 and nearly three years more than the average
number of years served by those without a prior felony record
who committed robbery after the abolition of parole.4 If Allen
remained imprisoned until his mandatory release date of 2012,
he will have served 17 years, a sentence virtually identical to the
average post-abolition robbery sentence for those with the most
serious felony records.5
The shocking reality is that Allen’s sentence was well within
the range of punishment available for his crimes.6 Most state
courts hold that prison sentences within the legislatively pre32

scribed range of a valid statute do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.7 Moreover, in
Virginia, a sentence that does not exceed the maximum sentencing guidelines prescribed by statute is not reversible on grounds
of abuse of discretion.8 Thus, the validity of Allen’s sentence
seemed indisputable, albeit harsh for a first-time offender with
such strong mitigating factors. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine
the sentence Allen would have received if he had a prior felony
record. The court reporter’s notes suggest that the judge
weighed societal intolerance of robbery, the need to protect victims, the fact that Allen was armed and masked, and the fact that
shots were fired during the robbery in determining a sentence.
While these are legitimate and reasonable concerns, news reports
on arguably more heinous crimes9 coupled with my own observations of the racial dynamic in Danville, suggested that race
may have affected the judge’s decision.
Without assuming conscious or unconscious racial bias, this
essay examines racial sentencing disparities between AfricanAmerican and White-American offenders at the state and federal
levels,10 and advocates a legislative solution to ensure that mitigating factors are not arbitrarily disregarded by judges. This
proposal will address the U.S. Supreme Court’s assertion that
“[a]pparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our
criminal justice system.”11 Removing judicial discretion in
downward departures may promote racial parity in criminal sentencing.
This article first provides a brief historical overview of racial
sentencing disparities, discussing indeterminate and determinate
sentencing. It then briefly discusses the futility of pursuing a
judicial solution, focusing on key decisions by the Supreme
Court in Washington v. Davis, McCleskey v. Kemp, and United
States v. Armstrong, and will analyze two radical and unrealistic
proposals for reducing racial sentencing disparities. The article
then proposes mandatory downward departures, considering
standardized offender characteristics and mitigating factors, including the pros and cons of the proposal. Finally, it concludes
that society should use non-race based solutions such as mandatory downward departures in sentencing to create parity in sentencing between White Americans and African Americans and
restore confidence and fairness to the criminal justice system.

RADICAL DISPARITIES
IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
As a historical matter, African Americans have routinely
been singled out for harsher punishment than White Americans.
During slavery, states enacted separate statutes known as “Slave
Codes” to punish slaves who committed specified offenses.12
Punishment under the Slave Codes for even minor transgressions
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was often brutal and inhumane.13 Meanwhile, these same codes the perception that criminals were being coddled signaled the
completely exonerated slave masters who killed slaves in the demise of indeterminate sentencing.30
In the mid-1970s, as support for indeterminate sentencing
course of punishing them for “resisting.”14
African Americans fared little better under the Black Codes declined, scholars and researchers advocated a less discretionary
of 1865, which controlled the movement and activities of newly form of sentencing known as determinate or presumptive senfreed slaves.15 The Black Codes penalized African Americans for tencing, in which similarly situated offenders receive similar
“offenses” similar to those for which they faced punishment un- sentences.31 At the heart of the proposal was a mandate to create
der slavery.16 While the Black Codes were eventually struck a set of guidelines to establish specified periods of incarceration
down by Congress after the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend- for corresponding levels of seriousness.32 Judges would then
ments were passed,17 and African Americans gained certain have limited discretion to consider aggravating or mitigating
rights and freedoms during Reconstruction, these victories were circumstances which would raise or lower the presumptive seneventually whittled away by Jim Crow laws in the wake of tence respectively.33 Under the proposal, parole would be phased
Plessy v. Ferguson.18 Under Jim Crow laws, African Americans out.34 While early determinate sentencing proposals did not
continued to face differential treatment and punishment under completely rule out rehabilitation as a goal, determinate sentencstate laws.19
ing has often been characterized as eschewing the rehabilitation
Above and beyond Jim Crow laws, African-American of- of offenders in favor of pursuing retribution or “just desserts” as
fenders were subject to the vagaries of indeterminate sentencing, its main goal.35
In 1984 Congress established the U.S. Sentencing Commisa punishment philosophy which emerged during Reconstruction,
eventually becoming the predominant method until the 1960s.20 sion to develop sentencing guidelines similar to those originally
Under indeterminate sentencing schemes, punishment is indi- proposed by advocates of reduced judicial discretion.36 The
vidually tailored to an offender’s unique situation or circum- Commission was authorized to consider the relevance of “an
stances. The trial judge has complete discretion to determine a offender’s age, education, vocational skills, mental and emosentence that falls within legislativelytional condition, physical condition
determined minimum and maximum
(including drug dependence, previous
terms applicable to each offense.21 The His sentence was nearly four and
employment record, family and comdriving philosophical force of indetermunity ties, role in the offense, crimione
half
times
the
national
minate sentencing is based on the thenal history, and dependence on crimiory that crime is a “moral disease” and average for robbery and virtually
nal activity for a livelihood.”37 The
double the national average
final draft guidelines retained some
punishment’s goal is “reformation of
original features but fell short in other
criminals...not the infliction of vindic- maximum state court sentence for
22
respects in that these guidelines for
tive suffering.” The ultimate length
murder.
of an offender’s sentence is determined
criminal offense levels failed to acby a parole board based on its view of
count for the full panoply of potentially
whether or not the offender has been rehabilitated after a period relevant offender characteristics originally suggested by Conof incarceration.23
gress in the enabling legislation.38 Also absent was a clear purWhile indeterminate sentencing schemes enjoyed early sup- pose for the sanctions, despite the clear legislative history in
24
port and appeared arguably beneficial to offenders in theory, which Congress sought to “require the judge to consider the four
history suggests that, in practice, due to their highly discretionary purposes of sentencing [rehabilitation, retribution, incapacitation,
nature, African-American offenders were often victims of racial and restitution] before imposing a particular sentence.”39
State reforms of earlier indeterminate sentencing schemes
bias under such schemes. Indeed, as early as 1933, researchers
noted “striking differences and wide disparity in sentence type preceded federal reforms, albeit for many of the same reasons
and length” under indeterminate sentencing schemes and sug- which drove federal reforms.40 Today, approximately 25 states
gested that “racial discrimination [manifested] itself in the form have some form of either guideline-based sentencing, presumpof more severe sentences for minority defendants than for tive sentencing, or a hybrid of the two.41 Many states also estabequally situated white offenders.”25 The futility of addressing lished mandatory minimum penalties for certain offenses that a
these disparities was increased by the fact that such sentences judge was required to impose upon conviction.42
However, the statistics gathered after most federal and state
were generally not reviewable and judges were not required to
explain their rationale.26 As parole was used to alleviate prison sentencing reforms were implemented are startling.43 A Bureau
overcrowding rather than for rehabilitation,27 doubts about the ad of Justice Statistics study on trends in discretionary and mandahoc nature of parole board decisions, the potential for misleading tory parole reported that, on average, African Americans remain
victims, and high recidivism rates prompted concerns about dis- incarcerated three months longer than White Americans in discrimination in the parole process.28 By the early 1970s, mount- cretionary parole systems and seven months longer than White
ing research suggested rehabilitation had failed,29 and growing Americans in mandatory state parole systems. In studying the
concerns about sentencing disparities, prison overcrowding, and issue, several states invariably agreed that racial bias has at least
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some influence on the decision-making process in state criminal
justice systems.44
Though much of the literature acknowledges the presence of
at least some racial bias at all levels of the criminal justice system,45 from arrest to incarceration, many other factors are cited
for their “superior explanatory power” - in particular, AfricanAmerican patterns of offending and prior criminal records of
African-American offenders.46 Furthermore, some scholars assert that society need not be concerned about racial disparities in
the criminal justice system if the system appears, for the most
part, objective and unbiased.47 Despite these arguments, there
are a number of valid reasons why racial sentencing disparities
warrant concern, chief of which is that most researchers even
those that conclude that legally relevant sentencing factors are
the chief reason for racial sentencing disparities, refuse to dismiss the possibility that racial discrimination does play a role in
sentencing.48

WHY “POSSIBLE” SOLUTIONS ARE NOT
“PROBABLE” SOLUTIONS

ally obligated to engage in jury nullification (i.e. the acquittal of
some non-violent African-American drug offenders without regard to their culpability).54 Butler seeks “subversion of American
criminal justice” by using jury nullification by African Americans “to cause retrial after retrial, until, finally, the United States
‘retries’ its idea of justice.”55
Butler’s arguments are persuasive but idealistic at best.56
Even if the U.S. Supreme Court’s position changes on affirmative action, Butler’s proposal would be limited if Justice O’Connor’s proposed 25 year sunset on affirmative action prevails.57
Butler attempts to skirt the substantive infirmities of his proposal
by couching his requirement for proportionality of arrest and
imprisonment of African Americans in terms that suggest
“goals,” not quotas. Even if the proposal were to survive the
political process, it would not likely survive strict scrutiny.58
Butler’s racially-based jury nullification proposal suffers on two
accounts. The proposal is intentionally radical and subversive59
and its implementation strategy might give prosecutors a sufficiently race-neutral reason to use preemptory strikes against African-American jurors.60

Pursuing a constitutional remedy for racial sentencing disTHE CASE FOR MANDATORY DOWNWARD
parities, specifically an Equal Protection challenge, would be an
DEPARTURES IN SENTENCING
exercise in futility because the court has typically upheld govern49
A standardized system of mandatory downward departures
ment action with a racially disparate impact. McCleskey and
Armstrong demonstrate that, notwithstanding clear evidence of in sentencing synthesizes two seeming incompatible ideas racial bias, claims that reach the threshold for an equal protection namely, reduced judicial discretion and the consideration of ofviolation based on disparate impacts are “available in theory, but fender characteristics and mitigating factors. Under this proposal, relevant mitigating factors and offender characteristics
unattainable in practice.”50
Additionally, two methods prowould be numerically standardized for
posed to cope with racial sentencing
judicial consultation, based on their
“A mandatory downward
disparities are affirmative action and
empirical relevance in explaining
departure system reflects a
racially-based jury nullification. Both
criminal behavior and how often they
modest attempt to preserve
remedies are targeted primarily at nonare cited by judges in downward deparcertain
elements
of
both
violent drug offenders engaged in
tures from sentencing.61 Judges would
consult the standardized form at sen“victimless crimes,” which seek to
determinate and indeterminate
tencing to assess the factors and characameliorate concerns about releasing
schemes in an objective
teristics in a particular case. If the facviolent minority offenders into the
package.”
tors were present, the judge would be
community and providing the same
required to reduce the sentence, accordopportunities for community-based
treatment, in lieu of incarceration, as are afforded White drug ing to the applicable sentencing guidelines, by the factors’
offenders.51 Butler justifies affirmative action using a modified weight. Judges would retain minimal discretion to depart further
version of the “diversity” rationale he calls “parity diversity,”52 downward based on factors not enumerated in the form, but
which presumes that disproportionate African-American crimi- would be required to provide a written explanation for this denality results from “the distorting influence of [W]hite suprem- parture. Judges would be prevented from considering the race of
acy on the political and legal processes by which ‘criminals’ are the offender.
named and selected for punishment”53 In order to combat this
This proposal would have several benefits. First, by defining
influence, the criminal justice system must artificially limit the mandatory factors for consideration and virtually eliminating
number of non-violent African-American drug offenders that judicial discretion, a mandatory downward departure system
come within its purview, regardless of their guilt or innocence, might significantly reduce the effect of racial bias at sentencing62
to achieve the parity that would be had in a truly color-blind sys- and ease the concern that judges will “use departures to impose
sentences according to their own ideals.”63 By the same token,
tem.
Butler’s racially-based jury nullification thesis rests on a using those mitigating factors most often cited by judges to jussimilar rationale. To combat the influence of White supremacy tify downward departures ensures that a mandatory departure
in the criminal justice system, African-Americans may be mor- system reflects sentencing considerations judges deem most per34
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tinent.
tection challenge despite being race neutral.69 Since strict scruSecond, to the extent that the selected mitigating factors are tiny is “strict in theory, but fatal in fact,”70 a race-neutral mandadisproportionately present in cases involving African-American tory downward departure system ostensibly aimed at reducing
offenders, mandatory departures based on these factors may racial sentencing disparities, particularly for African-American
close the racial disparity gap between African Americans and offenders, might be seen as presumptively invalid even if it siWhite Americans without relying on race. Downward departures multaneously helps White Americans. Nevertheless, the Suas a means of closing this racial gap would be far less vulnerable preme Court will tolerate remedies addressing the underto a constitutional challenge, would potentially reduce sentenc- representation of racial minorities which define in a race neutral
ing disparities with respect to other minorities, and could foster manner “the disadvantages... that racial minorities disproportionincreased confidence in the criminal justice system among Afri- ately face.”71
A third objection might lie in the U.S. Supreme Court’s recan Americans.
Third, a mandatory downward departure system comports cent decisions in Blakely v. Washington73 and United States v.
well with the rough consensus among legislators and commenta- Booker,74 which rendered both state and federal sentencing
tors that mitigating factors and offender characteristics should be guideline essentially advisory. The concern of the U.S. Supreme
considered at sentencing.64 Thus, the proposal would ensure the Court in those cases, however, was the judicial enhancement of
consistency which indeterminate sentencing schemes lack. sentences above the maximum dictated by statute based on facts
Lastly, to the extent that sentences
not decided by the jury,75 which violated
the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial.76
are ultimately reduced across the
A mandatory downward departure system
board, a mandatory downward de“A Bureau of Justice Statistics
presents the converse situation and, thereparture system might help to reduce
study
on
trends
in
discretionary
fore, would not implicate the Sixth
prison overcrowding and correcand mandatory parole reported
Amendment but instead pursues the pertional costs, a growing concern in
missible goal of sentencing parity.77
many states with determinate senthat, on average, African
65
Perhaps the strongest objections to
tencing. Moreover, the system conAmericans remain incarcerated
tinues to stress deterrence and incathis proposal are the further reductions of
three months longer than White
pacitation as society’s preferred
judicial discretion and its low political
Americans
in
discretionary
and
goals of punishment in order to
viability. Determinate schemes have been
seven months longer than White
equalize the system. Criminals are
criticized for being rigid and difficult to
not “coddled” by this system, but
apply.78 The Supreme Court clearly preAmericans in mandatory state
fers maintaining as much judicial senmerely treated as equally and fairly
parole systems.”
tencing discretion as possible.79 Furtheras possible.
more, this proposal appears to coddle
Objections to indeterminate sentencing schemes recognize that the system’s discretionary nature criminals, particularly violent criminals, at a time when citizens
invites the influence of racial bias at sentencing, invariably lead- are siding with politicians who adhere to tough crime policies.
ing to disproportionately severe sentencing outcomes for African But most of the criticism has been directed towards the lack of
Americans. By the same token, determinate sentencing schemes judicial discretion to consider offender characteristics in order to
either do not give judges adequate leeway to individualize sen- adjust sentences downward. This proposal for mandatory downtences, or are voluntary in nature and therefore susceptible to the ward departures would squarely address that issue. While waresame infirmities found in indeterminate sentencing schemes. housing criminals for long periods of time may help reduce
Inadequate consideration of mitigating factors and circumstances crime to a minor extent in the short term, it hardly constitutes a
long term solution.80
disproportionately impact African Americans.
A mandatory downward departure system reflects a modest
This proposal is vulnerable to several criticisms. First, a
mandatory downward departure system may only increase the attempt to preserve certain elements of both determinate and
influence of prosecutorial discretion in charging decisions, which indeterminate sentencing schemes in an objective package. It is
greatly influences sentencing.66 Prosecutors may begin to by no means a panacea for racial disparities in sentencing or for
“charge strategically to gain the upper hand in plea negotiations all of the ills afflicting the criminal justice system. Rather, it is
or introduce evidence of prior criminal activity or aggravating an additional tool that can be used to achieve the ultimate goals
circumstances at trial.”67 Because of the courts’ extreme defer- of racial parity and fairness in sentencing. Perhaps, if such a
ence to prosecutors, resulting sentencing disparities would likely system had been in place in Virginia a decade ago, Allen would
continue. However, this proposal presumes that sentencing re- have received a fair and just sentence for his misdeeds; one that
form will not occur in a vacuum. Concomitant reforms in other would have allowed him to return to society two years ago inareas of the criminal justice system, like prosecutorial discretion, stead of seven years from now.81
may help manage this problem.68
Second, this proposal would be vulnerable to an equal proSummer 2006
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